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Abstract: Delegation and policy rules are frequently suggested strategies for
governments to establish credible commitments.  Existing literature on rules and delegation
in macroeconomic policy has generally avoided the question of why governments that
delegate or establish rules do not subsequently reverse this decision. Either the decision is
assumed to be irreversible, or reversal is assumed to be “politically costly” without further
explanation.  We develop several hypotheses which suggest that the difficulty in reversing a
decision to delegate (or to establish a rule) depends on the structure of a country’s political
institutions.  Credible commitment through delegation can only be obtained in countries
where political institutions provide for checks and balances on executive authority.  Checks
and balances ensure that the decision to override a legally independent central bank is not the
prerogative of a single actor (or veto player).  In countries with these characteristics, the
extent of credibility gains will be greatest when political instability is moderate and when
polarization is high.  We find support for these hypotheses in tests using cross-country data –
from both developed and developing countries – on central bank independence and political
institutions.1
1. Introduction
For government actions ranging from utility rate-setting to monetary policy, the
importance of credibility for eliciting optimal responses from private actors is well-known.
When monetary policy lacks credibility, private sector actors write contracts that build in
high inflationary expectations; when utility rate-setting is not credible, private actors do not
invest in the expansion of electricity generation capacity.  However, it is also well-known that
credibility is difficult for governments to acquire.  One alternative for governments is to build
a reputation for sound policy, but building a reputation takes time.  A second set of
alternatives is for governments to delegate policy making to an independent agent (like an
independent central banker) or to adopt a policy rule (like an exchange rate peg).  Each of
these possibilities is thought to “tie the hands” of politicians with respect to their involvement
in economic policy making, thereby increasing the credibility of the resulting policies.
The literature that analyzes the impact of rules and delegation on policy outcomes,
however, often fails to ask two critical questions:  why would politicians ever willingly limit
their own discretion? and what prevents current or future governments from untying the
institutional knots that limit their discretion?  We argue that the extent to which rules or
delegation improve the credibility of policy depends upon a country’s political institutions.
Like Moser (1996) and Lohmann (1998), we hypothesize that the presence of checks
and balances (multiple veto players) in government should enhance the effects of delegation.
The framework we present, however, is more general.  First, the theory here encompasses
both fixed rules and delegation.  Second, it extends beyond checks and balances to
encompass polarization among political decision makers and instability of government.  We
describe conditions under which checks and balances can have an impact on policy credibility
even when it is no more difficult for governments to change delegation or policy rules than to
change policies directly.  Briefly, these conditions are that there be a moderate degree of
political instability (a positive probability that some, but not all, government decision makers
will be replaced in the future) and some political polarization.  Our empirical tests suggest
that the introduction of these concepts is crucial to explaining the success or failure of central
bank independence in lowering inflation.
While we believe that our analysis generalizes to all forms of agency independence,
ranging from judicial and regulatory to central banks, the availability of cross-country data on
central bank independence makes it convenient to focus on this area of policy for our
empirical work.  We test several hypotheses concerning the conditions under which
delegation in monetary policy will improve policy credibility and the conditions under which
governments will choose to delegate to an independent central bank.  These tests advance the
empirical literature on credibility and political institutions in several ways.
First, they show that by taking checks and balances into account, one can
demonstrate that legal central bank independence is significant in both developed and
developing countries.  Our results also shed light on contrary predictions regarding checks
and balances – on the one hand, that greater checks (more divided government) should lead to
larger budget deficits and, presumably, more inflation, and on the other hand, that checks
help to insulate the inflation-fighting ability of central banks from political meddling.
Second, the tests below demonstrate that the role of checks and balances depends crucially on
the level of polarization and instability in the political system.  At low levels of social
polarization, we find that checks and balances have little effect on central bank independence;
the opposite is true at higher levels.  Third, we test different rationales for the creation and
sustainability of independence, which distinguish between two theories.  One, by Alesina and
Gatti (1995), predicts that more polarized countries will exhibit greater independence.  A
second, following from the theory we develop below, is that central bank independence is2
more likely to last in countries with both polarization and checks and balances.  The second is
supported in the empirical tests below.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows.  Section 2 introduces the
different credibility problems which exist in monetary and fiscal policy making, and it briefly
reviews existing theoretical and empirical literature on rules and delegation in
macroeconomic policy.  Section 3 develops several hypotheses regarding the political
conditions under which rules and delegation will be more effective.  Section 4 conducts
empirical tests of these hypotheses using data on central bank independence.  Section 5
considers alternative explanations and section 6 concludes.
2. Rules and delegation as solutions to credibility problems
There are two different circumstances under which government policy commitments
are not credible.  The first is time inconsistency, which arises if politicians announcing a
certain policy today have an incentive to deviate from the policy at some point in the future.
In the presence of time inconsistency, economic agents respond slowly or not at all to current
policy changes, in the belief that if they do respond – for example, by locking themselves into
long-term fixed price contracts – political actors can benefit by reneging, for example, by
switching to an expansionary monetary policy to spark a temporary output boom.  Seminal
articles by Kydland and Prescott (1977) and Barro and Gordon (1983) conclude that time
inconsistency problems in monetary policy exist even when politicians are social welfare
maximizing.  This problem is of course more severe if politicians are interested in re-election,
giving them a particularly strong incentive to engineer a temporary boost in output during
pre-electoral periods.
Even when a particular government, given its objective function, is not expected to
renege on current policy commitments in the future, credibility problems remain in both
monetary and fiscal policy.  These derive from the possibility that a current government will
be replaced by a new government with different preferences, or that the constituencies of the
current government will change, leading to a change in its preferred policies.1  For fiscal
policy, Persson and Svensson (1989) and Tabellini and Alesina (1990) have shown that a
current government may issue excessive amounts of debt if a successor government is likely
to have different preferences over the level of public spending or the type of public goods
provided.  Cukierman, Edwards, and Tabellini (1992) suggest that a current government may
refrain from reforming a country’s tax system in order to avoid bequeathing increased
revenues to a successor.  The by-product is likely to be continued monetary financing of
government spending.  Alesina (1987) shows how uncertainty over the outcome of elections
can create a tendency for post-electoral macroeconomic cycles in both monetary and fiscal
policy.2  All of the above problems are exacerbated when political polarization and instability
are high.
                                               
1 While much of the literature equates credibility problems exclusively with situations where a
government has an ex post incentive to inflate once private sector actors have formed their expectations,
we also include instances where a current government's incentives change are influenced by the positive
probability that a government with different preferences will be elected in the next period.  Persson and
Svensson (1989) refer to this as the difference between time-inconsistent constraints and time inconsistent
preferences. 1 The objective function of a sitting government can change because, for example, of
demographic trends in a country, such as a decline in rural relative to urban areas or the aging of the
population, weakening their incentives to adhere to prior policy commitments.
2 A temporary boom when left-wing governments win elections, or a recession when right-wing
governments win.  The difference between left wing and right wing depends upon the relative weight
placed on price stability vs. output stabilization.3
A substantial literature concludes that delegation of monetary and/or fiscal policy to
an agency, or establishment of a policy rule, can mitigate credibility problems, provided that
delegation or fixed policy rules are themselves politically costly to revoke.  In most existing
contributions these political costs are assumed rather than explained.
Delegating to a central bank
Rogoff (1985) sparked a large literature by arguing that governments can counter
problems of time inconsistency by delegating monetary policy to a central banker who has
full discretionary power and who places a higher priority than the median voter on stabilizing
prices rather than output.  He concludes that delegation allows governments to achieve a
second-best outcome that involves lower average inflation at the cost of higher variability in
output.  Rogoff’s model assumes that once a decision to delegate is made, it cannot be
undone.3  Empirical investigation of the merits of monetary policy delegation awaited the
development of indices of legal central bank independence.  Cukierman, Webb, and Neyapti
(1992), using an index of independence that they constructed and which we utilize in this
study, examine 72 countries and find that legal independence is significantly, negatively
associated with inflation in 21 industrial countries, but not in 51 developing countries.4  They
suggest that the divergence results from less adherence to the rule of law in developing
countries.  We show below that central bank independence, interacted with different
institutional variables, is a significant predictor of inflation in a sample of both developed and
developing countries.
Delegation in fiscal policy
Giving authority over policy making to an agent who prefers prudent policy can also
be a tactic for addressing credibility problems in fiscal policy.  Delegation operates
differently here, however.  Delegating to an independent central bank involves giving full
authority over a domain of policy to agents who do not formally report to political actors.
Delegation in fiscal policy tends to involve delegation of budget preparation responsibility to
a bureaucratic agency that does ultimately report to a politician.  Fiscal delegation also entails
reducing the power of line ministries or legislative actors and increasing the authority of
budget bureaus or finance ministers, either of which ultimately report to the prime minister or
president.
Several studies of the effects of fiscal delegation have been undertaken of European
countries and Latin American countries.  Hallerberg and von Hagen (1997) find for a sample
of 15 EU countries that public debt is more likely to fall either when a delegation
arrangement is in place, or when cabinets collectively adopt a spending ceiling before
initiating the budget process.  In contrast, an index designed by Alesina, Haussmann,
Hommes, and Stein (1995) to measure the strength of the finance minister’s bargaining power
in budget negotiations is not significantly correlated with the average size of primary deficits
in a sample of Latin American and Caribbean countries.
                                               
3 More recent work investigates the possibility of designing optimal contracts with central bankers (Walsh
(1993) and Persson and Tabellini (1993).  These papers assume that once written, contracts are respected
by both parties.
4 These findings for advanced industrial countries have been repeated by Alesina and Summers (1993)
and Grilli, Masciandro, and Tabellini (1991).  When they measure independence as the frequency of
turnover of central bank governors, however, Cukierman, Webb, and Neyapti (1992) find that
independence and inflation are significantly negatively correlated, even for the developing country group.4
Monetary policy rules
Policy rules are a common alternative to delegating authority in order to enhance
credibility.  While they obviate the necessity of finding the “right” agent to delegate to, rules
also make it difficult to respond to shocks and to conduct counter-cyclical policy.  One of the
most common rules aimed at enhancing policy credibility is an exchange rate peg with full
currency convertibility.  When it is adhered to, it prevents governments from running an
independent monetary policy.  Theoretical work on exchange rate pegs assumes that it is
politically costly for governments to renege on its commitment to the peg, but does not
explain these costs in any detail.  It is not clear, for example, why governments would not
incur the same political costs if they had committed to pursuing a specific inflation rate, for
example, and then failed to deliver on their promise.  Cukierman, Kiguel, and Liviatan (1992)
argue that the political cost of reneging on a peg varies with the complementary policies that
governments adopt; since a currency board represents the most binding commitment, its
introduction is supposed to raise the political costs of reneging the most.  The underlying
reasons for this are not clear.
Nevertheless, there is empirical support for the proposition that adopting an exchange
rate peg with full convertibility is associated with better inflationary performance.5  There
have also been several attempts to examine the duration of exchange rate pegs as a function
of political stability, but no more detailed analyses of how the effectiveness of an exchange
rate peg might be endogenous to political conditions.
Fiscal policy rules
Policy rules in this domain involve numerical limits on fiscal deficits or public sector
borrowing.  These limits are sometimes stringent, as when budgets are required to be cash-
balanced throughout the year; and sometimes porous, as when the balanced budget rule
encompasses only a part of total public spending.  International evidence on the effect of
budgetary rules on fiscal policy is limited, but there is a sizable empirical literature on fiscal
policy rules adopted by US state governments.  Poterba (1994) and Bohn and Inman (1996)
find evidence that in US states with more restrictive budgetary rules, governments take
swifter action to raise taxes or cut spending in response to shocks.  Bohn and Inman (1996)
also make an attempt to endogenize the political environment by considering whether the
fiscal policy rules in US states are statutorily or constitutionally grounded and by proxying
for the independence of enforcing authorities (the judiciary).  They find that fiscal policy
rules are more effective when they are constitutionally grounded, and thus more difficult to
change, and when the judicial authorities that must enforce them are directly elected, rather
than being political appointees.
3. Conditions under which rules and delegation are credible
The previous section suggests that government policies confront credibility problems
when current governments have incentives to renege on policy commitments in future
periods, or if future governments are likely to have different policy preferences than current
governments.  It is well-recognized that political institutions can make policy more credible.
For example, Clague, Keefer, Knack and Olson (1996) provide evidence that countries with
                                               
5 Ghosh, et al. (1995) present econometric evidence from a dataset of over 100 developing and
industrialized countries over a thirty year period.  Controlling for annual dummies, output growth, the
rate of turnover of the central bank governor, and openness, they find that countries with fixed exchange
rate regimes experienced lower and less variable inflation.  This was particularly true of countries that
pegged their own currency to a single foreign currency (as opposed to a basket).5
more checks and balances and greater regime stability offer better protection to property
rights and attract more investment, which they interpret as signs of greater credibility.  The
issue in this paper is whether political institutions of countries also increase the impact of
delegation and policy rule arrangements on credibility.
The analysis of this issue is facilitated by introducing a modicum of notation.
Assume policy outcomes (such as inflation) are given by p t = f(xt) + et where the outcome is
a function of policy choices x, and e represents shocks or control errors in every period t .6
The outcome of a set of credible policies is given by p c.  Politicians can achieve this either
through delegation or a fixed rule.  Delegation requires giving policy making authority to an
independent agent whose preferences will be close to those of the credibility outcome (p c).7
In the central bank literature, the agency (the central bank) is assumed to attach a high weight
to price stability in its objective function, such that it gains less from opportunistically
expanding the money supply than do political authorities.  Second, politicians can establish a
policy rule of pursuing some policy outcome, p p t =  for all t and for all et „ 0.  The rule
constitutes a commitment by the government to allow policies x to change whenever
necessary (i.e., in the face of shocks) to ensure that the targeted outcome is sustained.8
Both of the above strategies improve the credibility of policies only to the extent that
it is more difficult for governments to overturn delegation arrangements or fixed policy rules
than it is for them to change policy itself.  In the literature on macroeconomic policy making
it has sometimes been suggested that this can be achieved by making the decision to delegate
or to create a rule “constitutional”, but no fully elaborated version of this argument has been
developed, and it leaves unanswered the question of whether a country’s constitution might
itself be easily changed.  The constitutional argument applies to one particular kind of
delegation or rules arrangement, given in Condition 1.
Condition 1:  Reversal of rules or delegation requires the approval of a greater
number of veto players than is necessary to change policies x.
When this condition is met, it is straightforward to describe the conditions under
which delegation increases the credibility of policy commitments: more politicians are
needed to dissolve a delegation arrangement than would ordinarily be needed to agree on a
change in economic policy.  This implies that, where there are multiple veto players, a larger
fraction of them must be replaced (or undergo a change in their preferences) in order to
overturn delegation than to replace existing policies with new policies.  To the extent that
                                               
6 This simple formulation assumes that only government policy decisions and exogenous shocks
influence policy.
7 In our analysis, for reasons of simplicity, we assume that politicians are able to find a perfect agent to
whom they can delegate monetary policy.
8 It is important to note that our discussion here applies only to policy rules which make some provision
for automatic changes in existing policies in order to sustainp .  For example, balanced budget rules may
simply disallow any taxation and expenditure decisions that deviate from the balanced budget, rendering
policy change automatic in the face of exogenous shocks.  In the American states studied by Bohn and
Inman (1996) and others, balanced budget rules sometimes have this characteristic.  The adoption of a
fixed exchange rate anchor does not always imply any explicit policy changes that must be made in the
event of shocks that make the anchor unsustainable.  Changing interest rates to make a peg sustainable is
left to the discretion of political officials.  If opponents of the anchor can veto interest rate changes that
ensure sustainability of the peg, establishment of the anchor does not improve credibility.  However, in
practice the exclusion of opponents from decision making on policy changes is generally accomplished
through delegation.  For example, if a currency board is established by the legislature, the policy changes
needed to sustain it in the face of shocks may be delegated to the central bank (interest rates) and the
finance ministry (establishment of spending ceilings).6
veto players have different preferences, delegation to an independent agent can solve both
time-consistency problems in monetary policy and credibility problems tied to polarization
and instability.  Condition 1 can be satisfied if delegation is “constitutional”, as has already
been suggested in the literature.  This would be the case if a 2/3 vote or two consecutive
majority votes of the legislature was required to dissolve a delegation arrangement while
policy changes in the absence of delegation could be made by simple majority vote.
Similarly, delegation would be effective if dissolving the delegation arrangement required the
approval of both the executive and legislature while policy changes in the absence of
delegation could be made by the executive alone.
Moser (1996) and Lohmann (1998) are the first to have explicitly examined the
notion that central bank statutes are more insulated from political influence in the presence of
checks and balances (multiple veto players with divergent policy preferences).  They are less
clear about the arrangements under which policy would be made in the absence of delegation,
however.  Lohmann (1998) examines central bank independence in Germany, arguing that the
government can exert pressure on the Bundesbank by threatening to revise its charter.  Any
such revision would require the agreement of both houses of parliament.  It would therefore
be an empty threat when the majority party in the Bundestag is not also well represented in
the Bundesrat, the second chamber of the German legislature.  In support of this argument,
Lohmann provides econometric evidence that Bundesbank monetary policy is more
expansionary, relative to underlying economic variables, during pre-electoral periods when
the same party controls both houses.
Moser (1996) makes a similar argument, and tests it on a sample of 22 OECD
countries using data on central bank independence, inflation, and an index designed to
measure whether a country’s political system is characterized by strong checks and balances
(essentially a bicameral system where both chambers have equal powers), weak checks and
balances, or none.  He finds that the negative impact of central bank independence on
inflation is strengthened in the presence of strong checks and balances, and that countries
with stronger checks and balances tend to have more independent central banks.
Neither analysis is clear on the counterfactual (decision making in the absence of
delegation).  In Moser’s analysis, for example, the design of the counterfactual has the effect
of exaggerating the benefits of delegation, because he requires political decision makers to
choose the Nash bargaining outcome, rather than giving them the option of doing nothing and
maintaining the status quo.9  The arguments of Lohmann and Moser are convincing in
showing that central bank independence depends on the level of checks and balances.  They
are less convincing in demonstrating that the credibility of policy making under central bank
independence is greater than policy credibility without delegation when checks and balances
are strong.  Condition 1, above, is crucial to making this point.
However, Condition 1, and the literature on the political economy of policy
delegation, leave unanswered the question of whether delegation or rules can have any
positive effect on policy credibility when the same decision makers must approve either the
dissolution of a delegation arrangement or a change in policy, as in Condition 2.  One of the
contributions of this paper is to offer an answer to this question.
Condition 2: Policy changes, on the one hand, and decisions to delegate authority or
to establish rules, on the other, require the approval of the same veto players.
Often condition 1 is not satisfied.  This is the case when policies, fixed policy rules
and delegation of policy making authority are all established under the same decision rules
                                               
9 Imagine two veto players with opposing preferences on monetary policy, as in Moser.  If the status quo
policy is one of moderate monetary expansion, the more conservative player will veto any attempt to
modify it.  The credibility benefits of delegation are less clear in this case.7
(e.g., majority vote for both, rather than majority for the first and super-majority for the last
two).  Can delegation or fixed policy rules nevertheless mitigate credibility problems?  In the
case of credibility problems induced by time inconsistency – the incentive of current policy
makers to renege on their own policy commitments in the future – the answer is no, unlike
with Condition 1.  If policy makers gain from reneging on policy commitments, then they
also gain from reneging on institutional changes that are meant to guarantee those
commitments.  If it is no more difficult to renege on the one than the other, the time-
inconsistency problem remains unchanged.
However, delegation or fixed policy rules can still relieve the credibility problems
that result from the possibility of change in government or in the preferences of government
decision makers.  For this to be true, first there must be multiple decision makers with
potentially different preferences, as under condition 1.  Second, there should be some
possibility that a subset of current government veto players will survive a change of
government and retain veto power over attempts by future governments to change policy.
This would be the case if the new government were a coalition government in which some
members of the coalition were also members of the previous government’s coalition.  Third,
there must be some possibility of an exogenous economic shock (et+i „0) that creates
dissatisfaction among all government decision makers with existing policy.
The importance of the exogenous shock condition is easy to see.  Assume to the
contrary, that there is a change of government, with some veto players carried over from the
previous government, and no exogenous shock.  If policy authority has been delegated, the
new government is unable to change either policy or the delegation arrangement without
gaining the agreement of representatives from the previous government.  However, policies
enjoy the same insulation from change as delegation and fixed policy rules, so there is no
increase in credibility as a consequence of adopting these measures.
Under most circumstances, the assumption that economic actors expect exogenous
shocks in the future is a modest one.  Once a shock occurs, it modifies the status quo such
that the policies x that were originally approved in order to achieve some agreed policy
outcomep1 instead lead to a different policy outcomep 2.  As a consequence, a change in
policies is needed to restore policy outcomes to the originally agreed p1.  The policy that
emerges will crucially depend on whether delegation or policy rules have been previously
adopted.
In the absence of either delegation or policy rules, whether or not these policy
changes are made depends on whether all government veto players prefer the old outcomep1
to the new status quo, p 2.  Consider a new government that has inherited some veto players
from the previous government, who prefer outcomep1, with the remainder of the veto
players preferring the new status quo, p 2.  Under this circumstance, no policy change is
possible to honor the previous government’s commitment to policy outcomep1.  More
generally, any new policy outcome that emerges in response to a change in outcomes top 2
will be the product of a bargain between the old and new veto players.  The outcome of this
bargain will be some p 3 that lies between whatever policy outcome the new veto players
prefer andp1, the preferred outcome of the old veto players.  The credibility of policy
commitments cannot be guaranteed against a change in government in the presence of
economic shocks.
The outcome is different if policy authority has been previously delegated, or if a rule
has been adopted.  In the case of delegation, a government assigns policy making authority to
an independent agency.  The expectation of government officials and private sector actors is
that the agency will modify policy as underlying economic conditions change (that is, when8
et „ 0) such that it always comes as close as possible to p c.  Now assume that there is a
new government and an economic shock.  Under delegation, the agency automatically
chooses a new set of policies to restore outcomes top c.  Under some types of fixed policy
rules, policies automatically change to restorep .  As long as some veto players from the
previous government exercise veto power in the new government, the new government can
do nothing to overturn delegation or fixed policy rules that lead to this outcome.  Whereas
before all veto players of the new government had to agree before the earlier policy outcome
could be restored following a shock, under delegation and fixed policy rules (under Condition
2) all veto players must agree in order to move away from the earlier policy outcome.
Delegation and fixed policy rules with automatic policy change therefore enhance the
credibility of government policy commitments in systems with shocks and multiple
independent political actors.
4. Three hypotheses about central bank independence and the separation of
powers
This paper is part of a large research program that is examining the effect of political
conditions on the influence of monetary rules and fiscal delegation.  In other work (see
Keefer and Stasavage, 1998) we establish conditions under which governments might prefer
to delegate or adopt fixed policy rules.  In this paper, we confine ourselves to developing
hypotheses from the foregoing analysis that can be tested using information on central bank
independence.  The first of these hypotheses is:
Hypothesis 1: The delegation of monetary policy making authority will have a
greater effect on credibility when there are a larger number of veto players.
The previous section showed that under either conditions 1 or 2, the credibility of
rules or delegation depends upon the existence of multiple veto players.  As long as veto
players have different preferences, which they almost always do given the fact that they are
elected at different times, or from different constituencies and jurisdictions, or are controlled
by different parties, the decisions of an independent central bank will be more difficult to
reverse than the policy decisions of the executive branch alone.  This suggests that the
credibility of monetary policy will be greater and inflation therefore lower for any given rate
of monetary expansion.  Multiple veto players may be present even in situations where basic
constitutional precepts are flouted, as long as no one individual, party, or group controls all
the levers of power.
However, the effects of multiple veto players should not be independent of other
political conditions, particularly the extent of political instability and political polarization in
a country.  The second hypothesis, emerging from the arguments of the previous section,
captures these issues:
Hypothesis 2: The interaction of checks and balances and central bank independence
will have a larger positive effect on credibility when there is some political instability and
polarization.
Whether condition 1 or condition 2 prevails, delegation will have a greater effect on
one credibility problem (not time-consistency, but rather the threat to credibility created by
changes in the identity and preferences of policy makers) when there is some political
instability, and when the actual and potential governing parties exhibit some differences over
policy preferences – that is, some polarization.  In the absence of instability, there is no threat
of policy reversal by a new government, because new governments are unlikely.  In contrast,
when instability is very high, meaning that all decision makers from the current government
are replaced when the new government enters, delegation will have little effect in reducing9
these credibility problems.10  Veto players in current governments, which approved the
original decision to delegate, will not be present in future periods to veto attempts to reverse
the decision.  Finally, when instability is moderate at least some members of current
governments may hold veto power under future governments, meaning that credibility
problems can be solved through delegation.
Without the second characteristic -- political polarization -- successor governments
are likely to have the same policy preferences as the current government, again making policy
change less likely.  New governments are likely to approve of, and hence retain, the policies
of the old governments.  Credibility problems deriving from the possibility of government
change would then not exist.  Delegation of policy should therefore have stronger effects in
countries that exhibit some polarization.
Finally, the logic in the previous section implies the following about the likelihood
that central bank independence will endure in countries that adopt it.
Hypothesis 3: Central bank independence is more likely to endure in countries that
exhibit multiple veto players in government and either moderate political instability or
polarization.
Countries adopt legal provisions that grant independence to central banks for a
number of reasons.  Some governments might wish to insulate their monetary policies against
amendments by future governments.  This effort is more likely to succeed if governments are
characterized by multiple veto players and if there is incomplete replacement of veto players
from one government to the next.  However, if there are few veto players, if instability is
severe, or if polarization is low, delegation is likely to be easily overturned (in the case of few
veto players and severe instability) or pointless (where all parties agree on monetary policy).
In this case, governments might not expend the effort to adopt central bank independence.  If
they nevertheless adopt legal provisions to guarantee independence, despite the absence of
these conditions (perhaps because it requires little effort to pass a law granting
independence), the law is more likely to be reversed subsequently, as the hypothesis states.
One potential weakness in this argument is that if future governments are likely to
have multiple veto players, so also are current governments.  Where there are multiple veto
players it is likely to be difficult to approve legislation creating central bank independence in
the first place.  If there are two political parties in a country, one of which is highly averse to
inflation and one much less so, then delegation may only occur during atypical periods when
the inflation-averse party controls all veto points.11
Governments need not, and often do not, adopt central bank independence in order to
insulate policies from meddling by future governments.  They also adopt central bank
independence as a last-ditch effort to demonstrate to investors and others their commitment to
fight inflation, much as countries adopt currency boards or fixed exchange rate pegs to
demonstrate commitment.  Such measures are, once again, less likely to endure if there are
few veto players, if political instability is extreme, or if political actors exhibit similar
preferences on policy issues (are not polarized).  There is one modification to hypothesis 3,
however.  If central bank independence is intended as a signal rather than an effort to insulate
policies against the meddling of future governments, the chances of central bank
independence enduring would always fall the greater is instability.  The relationship would be
monotonic rather than quadratic, as suggested in the hypothesis.
                                               
10 Note, this definition of instability is different from that which is commonly used in the political
economy literature.
11 Thanks to Stewart Wood for this observation.10
Alesina and Gatti (1995) construct an argument about polarization and central bank
independence that generates a similar prediction.  They argue that in a system where there are
two polarized political parties and where electoral outcomes are uncertain, delegating to an
independent central bank can lead to both lower inflation and lower variability of output,
because it minimizes not only time inconsistency problems but also the post-electoral cycles
identified in Alesina (1987).  They suggest that it would therefore be in the interests of both
parties to delegate.  They assume, however, that the inflation averse party cannot renege on
this deal once it arrives in office.  To the extent such reneging is anticipated, no deal would
be agreed to in the first place.  Indeed, the greater is polarization, the more likely such
reneging might be.  Our analysis suggests that the scenario Alesina and Gatti envisage will
only occur in countries where political institutions allow both sides to retain veto power over
any attempt to renege on the agreement.
The structure of hypotheses 1 and 2 and hypothesis 3 might seem to demand joint
testing.  Hypothesis 3 says that central bank independence is more likely to survive under the
very conditions that hypotheses 1 and 2 suggest will give independence a greater impact on
inflation.  For the moment, we have postponed this issue for future research.  Our primary
concern at this stage is to identify the role played by political institutions in determining the
efficacy of delegation arrangements.
5. Testing the hypotheses
This paper generally follows the empirical specifications utilized by Cukierman
(1992), Cukierman and Webb (1995) and Cukierman, Webb and Neypati (1992) in their
extensive research on central bank independence, augmented by the political and institutional
variables highlighted in the foregoing analysis.
Data
The theory presented earlier suggests conditions under which delegation improves
policy credibility.  Credibility is not directly measurable, of course.  The literature, however,
generally assumes that lack of credibility in monetary policy leads to higher inflation.  Our
dependent variable is therefore inflation, transformed as the rate of depreciation of money
computed from the Consumer Price Index in International Financial Statistics.12
The first of our key explanatory variables is a measure of central bank independence.
Cukierman, Webb, and Neyapti (1992) propose an index of legal central bank independence
based on twelve different characteristics of central bank statutes involving issues such as the
term of office for the governor and provisions for replacement, provisions for central bank
lending to government, and resolution of conflicts over monetary policy between government
and central bank.  Their data covers 72 countries with separate values for each decade from
1950 to 1990.  This is the measure of central bank independence that they and others have
found to be have a significant negative impact on inflation in developed but not developing
countries.  One of the contributions of this paper is to show that when political and
institutional characteristics of a country are taken into account, legal central bank
independence is influential in all countries.
These investigators also employ a de facto measure of independence, based on the
frequency of turnover of central bank presidents, which is associated with lower inflation in
all countries.  They argue that in countries where the rule of law is weak, legal protection of
                                               
12 The rate of depreciation moderates the influence of outlier countries that experience hyperinflation.
We will follow Cukierman, Webb, and Neyapti (1992) who, because central bank data is available only by
decade, employ geometric decade averages for currency depreciation.11
central bank independence is less meaningful, so one must utilize other proxies.  We do not
consider the de facto measure in this paper, primarily because legal measures of central bank
independence have greater policy relevance (it is difficult to legislate against turnover).
However, we expect (and will verify in future work) that the same political and institutional
variables that make legal delegation more durable and effective also make it more difficult to
force the resignation of uncooperative central bank presidents.
With respect to checks and balances and polarization, we would ideally like to have
information on the number of government decision makers in each country who exercise veto
power over monetary policy and central bank delegation decisions, and on the preferences of
these decision makers.  Given the paucity of cross-country data on this precise concept, we
rely instead on a series of proxy variables.
For the effectiveness of checks and balances (multiple veto players) in a country, we
use information on executive constraints and party fractionalization. Gurr and Jaggers and
others have developed a measure of “executive constraints” based on a subjective assessment
of different countries over time, in the Polity III dataset.  It ranges from the lowest value (1),
where “there are no regular limitations on the executive’s actions (as distinct from irregular
limitations such as the threat or actuality of coups and assassinations)”, to the highest value
(7), where groups such as a legislature or a ruling party have “effective authority equal to or
greater than the executive in most areas of activity” (Gurr and Jaggers).
An alternative measure of checks and balances, or the number of veto players, is
“party fractionalization”, a variable running from 0, low fractionalization, to 1, high
fractionalization (Banks, 1993).13   The greater the value of the index, the larger the number
of independent actors (political parties) whose agreement will be necessary to build a
governing coalition.  Each party in a coalition is therefore a potential veto player; where the
party system is fractionalized, the number of such veto players potentially rises.  As with the
index for executive constraints, we predict that legal central bank independence will be more
likely to improve credibility when levels of fractionalization are high.
These variables are inevitably imperfect proxies for checks and balances.  Executive
constraints is subjective, always creating the danger that lack of movement in policy variables
might be the indicator that evaluators use to decide that executives are indeed constrained.
We consider it highly unlikely that the ability of the executive to interfere in monetary policy,
specifically, is a significant criterion used by evaluators, however, and regard the potential for
simultaneity bias to be low.  The party fractionalization variable does not distinguish between
countries with a fractionalized government and unitary opposition, or the reverse.  It is only
the former that would be predicted to lead to greater checks and balances.  However, the
inherent measurement error in the proxy biases results against a finding that checks and
balances matters for policy outcomes.
Cross-country evidence on the polarization among different veto players of
government, or among political parties in or out of government, is not available. A common
practice in the literature is to attempt to observe the frequency of “significant” changes in
government as a proxy for the presence of both polarization and instability.  We employ
several, more specific proxies for polarization in societies.  All three are invariant over time
(there is only one observation per country).  The first is income inequality (measured by the
Gini coefficient), on the assumption that countries with severe income inequality are likely to
be more polarized than those that are not (Deininger and Squire, 1996).  Two others are
measures of ethno-linguistic fractionalization in countries.
                                               







where ti   is the proportion of
members associated with the ith party in the National Assembly.12
The Atlas variable is the probability that any two individuals drawn randomly from
society do not belong to the same ethno-linguistic group.  This data was assembled by
Russian geographers in 1964 (Department of Geodesy and Cartography).  This variable runs
from 0 to 1, with one indicating higher ethno-linguistic fractionalization.  The Sullivan
variable, ranging from 0 to 100 and collected in the 1980s, is the fraction of society that
belongs to the largest ethno-linguistic group.  High values therefore represent low levels of
fractionalization.
We have transformed these two variables, following the arguments of Esteban and
Ray (1994), that polarization is properly described as highest when there are a few equally
sized groups in society with differing preferences.  In contrast, when there is one monolithic
group and some small ones (low fractionalization) or many small groups (high
fractionalization), polarization is lower.  Both Atlas and Sullivan were therefore subjected to
a quadratic transformation into new variables (Atlas-New and Sullivan-New) which take their
highest values at moderate values of the original variable, and their lowest values at either
high or low values of the original.  That is, Atlas-New was set equal to Atlas - (Atlas)
2, with
the new variable ranging in value from 0 to .25, and Sullivan-New was set equal to
100*Sullivan – (Sullivan)
2, with the new variable ranging in value from 0 to 2500.
Available cross-country measures of instability are not closely matched to the form of
instability that we specify in the model.  Variables generally capture the rate of replacement
of entire governments rather than the rate of replacement of veto players.14 The two
measures of instability that we investigate are the rate of executive turnover (taken from the
Polity II data set), and the frequency of transition from one authoritarian government to
another or from a democratic government to an authoritarian government (Clague, Keefer,
Knack and Olson, 1996).  These indicate when the executive of a country changes, but do not
register whether control in other branches of government has also shifted, or whether all
coalition partners have been replaced.  As long as executive changes reflected in these
variables disproportionately represent replacement of all veto players, their influence on
inflation, even at moderate levels, is likely to be positive.  In the discussion of the empirical
analysis of hypothesis 2, below, these implications are examined more closely.
There is little consensus in the literature on other appropriate control variables to
include as explanations for inflation.  Moreover, as Cukierman, Webb and Neypati note, the
use of decade frequency data reduces possibilities for using  economic controls such as
lagged inflation, growth or terms of trade to explain inflation.  These would, in any case, also
be indirectly influenced by the political and institutional variables, giving rise to multi-
collinearity that would cloud the underlying relationships we examine.  To guard against the
possibility that it is country income that explains the success of central bank independence,
rather than institutional arrangements (such as executive constraints) that are often associated
with income, we examine the robustness of our results to inclusion of real income per capita.
To control for the possibility that there is a shift in preferences in a particular decade both to
low inflation and, correspondingly, low inflation rates, we always control for decade dummy
variables, matching the different periods for which central bank independence data is
available. More generally, decade averages are taken of all variables, to correspond to the
measure of central bank independence that we use.
Testing hypothesis 1
One important motivation for further research into the importance of central bank
independence is the apparent lack of influence of legal measures of independence on inflation
                                               
14 Alternatively, some have used the frequency of coups d’état or of extra-constitutional changes in
government as a proxy for polarization and instability.13
on a sample that includes both developed and developing countries.  Column 1 of Table 1
indicates this clearly.  The effect of legal central bank independence on the rate of currency
depreciation is not significantly different from zero.
To test hypothesis 1, we use ordinary least squares to examine the effect on inflation
of executive constraints and party fractionalization, interacted with central bank
independence, controlling for period dummies.  The assumption implicit in these regressions
is that entities that constrain the executive, and the parties that are fractionalized, have
different policy preferences, as hypothesis 1 requires.
Columns (2) and (4) offer significant support for hypothesis 1.  In each, the
interaction terms is of the correct sign and highly statistically significant.   Results for the
executive constraints measure are especially strong.  The explanatory power of the model,
after including the executive constraints and interaction terms, rises from an R
2 of 0.13 in
column 1 to 0.22 in column 2.
Columns (3) and (5) comprise one possible rigorous test of robustness, the inclusion
of income per capita.  The test is rigorous because the variable is highly correlated with both
party fractionalization (.59) and executive constraints (.60) in the sample.  Nevertheless, the
magnitude of the coefficient on the interaction term falls only slightly and remains
statistically significant in the case of executive constraints. The interaction with party
fractionalization drops much more, and although the term retains the predicted sign, it is no
longer statistically significant.
Table 1 has two other interesting implications.  First, it has frequently been suggested
that divided governments (whether because they are coalition governments or because
different branches are controlled by different parties) lead to fiscal excess (McCubbins, 1991)
or delayed fiscal stabilizations (Alesina and Drazen, 1991).  One reason to care about budget
deficits is inflation.  What is clear from Table 1, however, is that the net effect of two proxies
for divided government – executive constraints and party fractionalization – have a net
negative impact on inflation.
Looking at column (2), when central bank independence is at its lowest value in the
sample (.09), the net effect of an increase in executive constraints from its lowest sample
value (1) to its highest (7) is a drop in average yearly currency depreciation of 0.04.15  This
is approximately one-third of the sample standard deviation of currency depreciation.  This
effect rises to 0.27, or more than two standard deviations, when central bank independence is
at its highest value in the sample.
Results for party fractionalization are somewhat weaker, but nevertheless provide no
support for the notion that inflationary pressures are greater when governments are divided.
When central bank independence is at its lowest, an increase in party fractionalization from 0
to its highest value (.98) actually leads to an increase in inflation of .54 standard deviations
(.06).  When central bank independence is at its highest level, this increase in party
fractionalization results in a reduction in inflation of .20, or 1.67 standard deviations.
The results for executive constraints are inconsistent with the theory in the existing
literature, since both the linear and interactive executive constraint coefficients are negative.
Results for party fractionalization are not especially supportive of the theory, particularly
given the results at high levels of central bank independence.  Both highlight the fact that
multiple political actors who tie their own hands through the use of central bank
independence can achieve lower levels of inflation than single unconstrained executives
acting without central bank independence.
                                               
15 -0.006 – (7 – 1)*0.064*.09.14







































































































2 0.13 0.22 0.23 0.15 0.20
p-value for F
statistic
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Number of
observations
218 210 199 216 205
Note: Ordinary least squares with White’s heteroskedastic-consistent standard errors
in italics. CBI = Central bank independence
The second implication of Table 1 is for the literature on central bank independence.
The two central bank terms in every equation have opposite signs, indicating that in the
absence of any checks and balances, central bank independence is actually associated with
higher, rather than lower inflation.  Why might this be?  One significant possibility is the
signaling hypothesis mentioned earlier.
Governments that have no way to demonstrate their credibility to investors (for
example, governments lacking in checks and balances) are more likely to announce legal
measures that enhance central bank independence when they are confronted with severe
inflationary pressures.  Governments that exhibit greater checks and balances might also be15
tempted to do this, but are likely to find it more difficult for two reasons.  First, the sheer
difficulty of decision making is greater in these countries, given the number of actors who
must agree.  Second, multiple veto players will regard the decision with greater seriousness,
since they will be more concerned than in the single actor case that the independent agency
will take future actions with which the actors disagree, but about which they will be able to
do little. Given this asymmetry, it is no longer surprising that central bank independence is
associated with higher inflation where governments exhibit fewer checks and balances.  This
result also  casts doubt on the utility of announcements of central bank independence as
useful devices for signaling the credibility of government monetary policies.
The results in Table 1 also provide an explanation for Cukierman et al.’s finding that
legal central bank independence is significantly and negatively correlated with inflation in
advanced industrial countries but not in developing countries.  Table 1 suggests that this can
be attributed to differences in political institutions across these countries.  However, many
developing countries possess at least some level of checks in government.  The results in
Table 1 are robust in sub-samples of either developing or developed countries.
Testing hypothesis 2
To examine hypothesis 2, we adopt a straightforward methodology.  We ask whether
the interaction of checks and balances with central bank independence is greater when
polarization or instability are high than relative to when they are low.  That is, we split the
sample at the means of the polarization and instability variables, and run ordinary least
squares on each sub-sample, using the specifications of columns (2) and (4) in Table 1.
Provided that our measures of polarization and instability are appropriate to it, hypothesis 2
would be rejected if the coefficients on the interaction terms are larger (less negative) when
polarization or instability are high than when they are low.  That is, support for hypothesis 2
emerges if the interaction of central bank independence with the checks and balances
variables has a stronger negative effect on inflation when polarization and instability are
higher relative to when they are lower.
Tables 2 and 3 display the results of this experiment for the three polarization
variables described in the data section:  Atlas-New, Sullivan-New, and the Gini measure of
income inequality.  Most of the results are strongly consistent with hypothesis 2.  The
interaction with executive constraints is significantly more negative at higher levels of Atlas-
New and Sullivan-New; the difference in coefficients is of the right sign in the case of the
Gini measure, but insignificant.  The interaction with party fractionalization, in Table 3, is
also more negative under higher values of the three polarization variables, although this
difference is not significant with Atlas-New.
Table 1 offers more comprehensive evidence than has previously been available
showing that the effects of central bank independence depend on the level of checks and
balances in a country.  However, the paper offers an alternative and arguably more general
account of when checks and balances are likely to matter.  Tables 2 and 3 provide significant
evidence for part of this account, that checks and balances make a larger contribution to
policy credibility when societies are more polarized.
The theory we develop above also suggests that checks and balances are more likely
to matter when there is some instability in the identity or preferences of veto players.  As the
description of the data on political instability indicates, however, data on replacement of veto
players is not available.  When we included the two variables on executive change described
in the data section, following the specifications in Tables 2 and 3, we find not surprisingly
that the interaction of checks and balances with central bank independence has a strong
negative influence on inflation at low levels of instability rather than high.  At high levels of
instability, the effects of central bank independence are generally insignificant.  Given these16
variables, and the correctness of our interpretation of them as reflecting rates of complete
replacement of veto players in government, these results are consistent with the theory set out
earlier.  When there is a high rate of replacement of all veto players, central bank
independence is more difficult to preserve, and therefore is less likely to have a positive effect
on the credibility of monetary policy in a country.














































































2 0.29 0.21 0.44 0.17 0.31 0.23
p-value for F
statistic
0.00 0.0017 0.0001 0.0001 0.00 0.00
Number of
observations
110 100 87 123 104 104
Note: Period dummies not reported.  Ordinary least squares with White’s
heteroskedastic-consistent standard errors in italics. CBI = Central bank independence.  Mean
of SullivanNew=1558.  Mean of AtlasNew=.15. Mean of Gini Income Inequality=42.
Testing hypothesis 3
Hypothesis 3 predicts that central bank independence is more likely to be adopted, or
to endure, in countries that exhibit checks and balances and either regular, partial replacement
of veto players or polarization.  This is in contrast, for example, to the prediction of Alesina
and Gatti (1995), whose theoretical argument concludes with the prediction that polarization
alone (in the form of polarized parties in a two party system) is more likely to lead to the
adoption of central bank independence.  Unfortunately, the data on political stability do not
permit us to test the element of hypothesis 3 pertaining to instability.  This section therefore
focuses on the interaction of polarization and checks and balances.
In order to test hypothesis 3, we performed a third series of regressions with legal
central bank independence as the dependent variable, regressed first on executive constraints
interacted with measures of polarization, and then on party fractionalization interacted with
polarization.  There is little theory to guide the choice of variables that belong in a country’s
decision to approve and maintain legal central bank independence, so we include only income
per capita and period dummies in addition to the relevant institutional and political variables.17
One consequence of this under-specification is the very low explanatory power of the models.
Nevertheless, as Table 4 illustrates, the estimated coefficients of interest are generally
significant and supportive of hypothesis 3.
















































































2 0.28 0.13 0.23 0.12 0.18 0.22
p-value for F
statistic
0.00 0.041 0.0023 0.0065 0.00 0.00
Number of
observations
115 101 90 126 103 111
Note: Period dummies not reported.  Ordinary least squares with White’s heteroskedastic-
consistent standard errors in italics. CBI = Central bank independence.  Mean of
SullivanNew=1558.  Mean of AtlasNew=.15. Mean of Gini Income Inequality=42.
The results presented in Table 4 have two major implications.  First, they offer
support for the prediction of Hypothesis 3 that central bank independence is more likely to be
approved and to endure in countries with checks and balances, and that this effect is stronger
in the presence of some polarization.  Second, there is little support for the prediction that
polarized countries are more likely to possess independent central banks absent the mediating
impact of checks and balances.
Columns (1) and (4) in Table 4 offer one test of the hypothesis that polarization
contributes positively to the presence of checks and balances.  In both cases, the polarization
variable (Atlas-New and Sullivan-New) actually have negative coefficients and are
insignificant.  The interaction terms with the two measures of checks and balances and both
measures of polarization, on the other hand, provide some support for the thesis that checks
and balances in combination with some polarization increases the likelihood that countries
will have independent central banks. The interaction of Atlas-New with executive constraints
is positive and highly significant, and a similar result is obtained when Atlas-New is
interacted with party fractionalization.  Results with Sullivan-New are weaker.  However, the
interaction of Sullivan-New with party fractionalization is of the correct sign and statistically
significant using generous criteria (the p value is 0.14). The interaction of Sullivan-New with
executive constraints is of the wrong sign, but is highly insignificant (with a p value of 0.90).18
Results with income inequality are different.  First, income inequality without an
interaction term is positively – though not statistically significantly – associated with central
bank independence.  Second, interactions between income inequality and both executive
constraints and party fractionalization are associated with less central bank independence,
rather than more as in Table 4 and as predicted in hypothesis 3.  This result seems to be
idiosyncratic to this particular measure of polarization, however.
We can suppose that in countries with high inequality there are a large number of
poor and a few rich.  It is likely that the rich always control at least one veto gate in these
countries.  Fractionalization and executive constraints are likely, therefore, to indicate that the
poor control a larger number of veto gates.  If central bank independence is viewed as a
mechanism to limit the ability of the government to finance redistributive spending, the poor
would resist it.  Therefore, greater fractionalization or more effective executive constraints
would interact with income inequality to reduce the chances that independence would be
adopted.  This does not undermine the argument motivating Tables 2 and 3, which says that,
once adopted, central bank independence will be more effective as both checks and balances
and income inequality increase, an interaction that makes independence more difficult to
reverse.
This argument is also consistent with the signs of the Atlas-New and Sullivan-New
interaction terms in Table 4.  These variables do not presuppose any particular situation or
policy preference of the polarized groups, as does the Gini coefficient.  Similarly, it is much
less plausible to assume in the case of ethno-linguistic polarization that an increase in checks
and balances necessarily entails increased strength for a particular position for or against a
particular monetary or fiscal policy.  In this sense, these polarization measures appear to be
more generalizable.
5. Relevance of these results to other analyses of central bank independence
There are several alternative hypotheses in the literature for both the effect of central
bank independence on policy credibility and the factors which lead governments to delegate
monetary policy.  These hypotheses involving signaling, interest group politics, and the need
to solve intra-government conflicts.  Our findings are relevant to each of them.
Signaling
Delegation or fixed policy rules might be viewed as signaling devices, through which
governments signal their true type and thus distinguish themselves from governments that
make promises to pursue sound policies but have no intention of actually doing so (Maxfield,
1997).  In order for a signal to communicate the credibility of government commitments, it
must be costly to send and it must provide a low-cost means for investors to gather
information.16  The costs of signaling in the case of central bank independence are not
generally detailed.  Maxfield and Clark (1997) suggest that when multiple veto players must
agree on central bank independence, the cost of using central bank independence as a signal
increases. However, if the signal is costly to send because of these institutional
considerations, it may well be that private economic actors respond positively not because
they have better information about government policy preferences, but simply because it is
difficult for the government to override the central bank once independence is granted.
                                               
16 It is not clear why investors would not also find other signals such as money supply growth, interest
rates and foreign exchange rates to be at least as valuable, however.19
Table 4:  Determinants of central bank independence:




















































































2 0.05 0.13 0.10 0.12 0.05 0.05
p-value for F
statistic
0.14 0.041 0.0011 0.0065 0.27 0.23
Number of
observations
186 186 190 126 196 202
Note: Period dummies and income per capita not reported (income per capita is always highly
insignificant).  Ordinary least squares with White’s heteroskedastic-consistent standard errors
in italics.
Interest groups
Posen (1995, 1993) argues that the degree of financial sector opposition to inflation
explains both a country’s inflationary performance and its degree of central bank
independence.  Its core idea is that the more financial intermediaries have balance sheet
structures that make them highly averse to unanticipated inflation, the more they will lobby
to oppose any excess monetary expansion.  Financial intermediaries will be more averse to
inflation the greater the mismatch in maturities between liabilities (like short-term deposits)
and assets (like long-term loans which are not easily marketable).17  However, financial
intermediaries must eventually work through the political process to achieve their goals.  As
the theory in this paper suggests, if there is substantial political instability, or an absence of
checks and balances, financial intermediaries cannot count on central bank independence to
achieve monetary stability.
                                               
17 One problem with this argument is that it assumes that financial intermediaries will prefer to use their
resources to lobby rather than to adjust to a new policy environment.  Over time, commercial banks
could alter their balances sheet structures accordingly if a country becomes inflation prone.  Posen (1995)
touches on this issue but does not explore it in depth.20
 Intra-government conflicts
Bernhard (1998) has recently suggested that politicians may delegate monetary policy
to a central bank in order to solve potential intra-governmental conflicts.  Empirical results
support his hypothesis, and are broadly consistent with our own arguments.  Bernhard argues
that when a government retains control of monetary policy, choices to raise or lower interest
rates may be likely to generate conflicts between different members of the majority coalition.
This could be the case if the timing of elections for different members of the majority
coalition differs (so some would benefit from surprise inflation while others would not), if the
preferences of constituents of different legislators within the majority coalition are
heterogeneous, or if backbenchers are unable to discern whether an inflationary outcome is
due to circumstances beyond the government’s control.  Conflicts will only arise, however, if
backbenchers are able to sanction the government, for example by bringing down a coalition
government.  Under these conditions it may be beneficial for both sides to make a decision to
delegate monetary policy to an independent agent.  However, like Alesina and Gatti, who
make a broadly similar argument, Bernhard does not ask what keeps backbenchers and
ministers from reneging on a deal to delegate once it is made.
He conducts statistical tests based on a small sample of 18 OECD countries and finds
that indices designed to measure heterogeneity of constituent interests and the ability of
backbenchers to sanction ministers are both significantly associated with greater legal central
bank independence.  He also finds that strong bicameralism (which he suggests is likely to be
associated with heterogeneous preferences of legislators) is significantly correlated with
greater legal central bank independence.  While Bernhard’s theory of when governments will
delegate to a central bank differs from our own, the correlation between countries with strong
bicameralism and central bank independence is consistent with our own hypothesis 3.  More
broadly, countries where political institutions produce majorities where legislators have
heterogeneous preferences and where backbenchers (or coalition members) are able to
sanction governments are also likely to be countries where the number of veto players with
different preferences necessary to agree to an override of central bank independence is
relatively high.
6. Conclusion
The importance of the study of central bank independence lies both in its own
potential importance for the conduct of macroeconomic policy and in the implications it has
for a host of other government functions.  The independence of the judiciary and of
administrative agencies, the relevance of fixed government policy rules of all kinds, can all
be informed by a better understanding of when central bank independence matters for
economic outcomes.  This paper is an attempt to advance our understanding of these issues
by deepening the political arguments surrounding independence and testing them on a broad
and disparate set of countries.
The paper has several messages.  First, theoretically, the importance of checks and
balances depends on other dimensions of the political environment, including levels of
political instability (measured as the rate of replacement of veto players) and the extent of
polarization in society.  Second, by examining a large set of countries, we can say more
conclusively that monetary delegation is only a potential solution to credibility problems
when political institutions provide for multiple veto players with different preferences.  This
generalizes earlier results by Moser (1996) and Lohmann (1998), who restrict their attention
to industrialized countries.  Third, unlike previous studies we show that the combined effect
of the presence of multiple veto players and monetary delegation is much stronger in
countries with higher levels of polarization, and much lower in countries with significant
rates of replacement of crucial government decision makers.21
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